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In a 2007 empirical report, Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom provided the ﬁrst evidence that
preverbal infants at 6 and at 10 months of age evaluate others on the basis of their helpful
and unhelpful actions toward unknown third parties. In their “hill paradigm,” a Climber
puppet tried but failed to climb a steep hill, and was alternately bumped up the hill by the
Helper and bumped down the hill by the Hinderer. After being habituated to these events,
both 10- and 6-month-olds selectively reached for theHelper over theHinderer. In response,
Scarf et al. (2012b) provided evidence that rather than reﬂecting an early developing capacity
for social evaluation, infants’ choices in Hamlin et al. (2007) reﬂected low-level perceptual
preferenceswhereby infants are drawn to any character who is associatedwith the Climber
bouncing. The current studies represent an attempt to adjudicate between the social and
perceptual accounts of infants’ preferences for Helpers over Hinderers in the hill paradigm,
by pitting a perceptual cue (e.g., bouncing) against a social cue (e.g., whether or not the
Climber gazes toward his goal). Infants’ patterns of preference across two experiments
support the social account.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to distinguish “friend” from “foe” is one of the most
important skills for survival in the complex social world. In recent
years, a small but growing body of research has reported that the
roots of humans’ capacity for social evaluation may be present
just a few months after birth. In this research, infants as young
as 3 months selectively attend to and reach for prosocial versus
antisocial others, preferring individuals who have helped versus
prevented others in achieving their unfulﬁlled goals (see review
in Hamlin, 2013a). Evidence to date suggests that within the ﬁrst
year of life, infants socially evaluate characters who help and hin-
der others in four distinct unfulﬁlled goal scenarios (Hamlin et al.,
2007, 2013a; Hamlin and Wynn, 2011), evaluate helping and hin-
dering ﬂexibly based on the context in which they occur [Hamlin
et al., 2011, 2013b; Hamlin, 2014 (but see Scarf et al., 2012a and
response by Hamlin et al., 2012)], and evaluate others based on
their prosocial and antisocial mental states rather than the positive
and negative outcomes they cause (Hamlin et al., 2013a; Hamlin,
2013b). In the second year, infants prefer characters who dis-
tribute resources fairly versus unfairly (Geraci and Surian, 2011;
see also Burns and Sommerville, 2014), and toddlers selectively
direct their own prosocial acts toward helpers and their own anti-
social acts toward hinderers (Hamlin et al., 2011). Together, these
results suggest that the capacity to distinguish friends from foes is a
foundational aspect of humans’earliest developing social cognitive
systems, feeding into emerging systems of sociomoral action.
Despite this growing body of evidence suggestive that young
infants prefer prosocial to antisocial others, a recent paper by
Scarf et al. (2012b) suggests that early demonstrations of infants’
social evaluations may have been based on physical, rather than
social, aspects of helping and hindering events (Scarf et al., 2012b).
Speciﬁcally, Scarf et al. (2012b) suggest that Hamlin et al. ’s (2007,
2010)“hill paradigm”(adapted fromoriginal stimuli by Kuhlmeier
et al., 2003; see also Premack and Premack, 1997) contained low-
level perceptual events that were themselves sufﬁcient to inspire
preferences for helpers and against hinderers, without necessitat-
ing any unique consideration of the social value of helping and
hindering. The current studies represent an attempt to adjudicate
between the social and perceptual accounts of infants’ preference
for helpers over hinderers in the hill paradigm.
THE HILL PARADIGM BY Hamlin et al. (2007)
All events began with a “Climber” (most commonly a red, circular
wooden character with large plastic ‘googly’ eyes) resting at the
bottomof a hill containing two inclines, one shallow andone steep.
To imply that the Climber’s goal was to reach the top of the hill, the
googly portions of theClimber’s eyeswere ﬁxed diagonally upward
such that he “gazed” uphill during the entirety of each event1.
“Helpers”and“Hinderers”weremost commonly a blue square and
a yellow triangle (whose googly eyes remainedmoveable); whether
the square or the triangle was the Helper was counterbalanced
across infants.
At the start of both Helper and Hinderer events, the Climber
ﬁrst moved easily up the shallow incline to a landing where he
1I regret that this methodological detail was omitted from the methods sections of
Hamlin et al. (2007, 2010). It was, however, observable in the stimuli videos available
online.
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wiggled back and forth. He then made two unsuccessful attempts
to climb the steeper incline; on his ﬁrst attempt he made it 1/3 of
the way up before coming back down and on his second attempt
he made it 2/3 of the way. To imply the Climber’s movements
up and down the hill reﬂected a failed intention to climb to the
top, during each ascent the Climber decelerated as though ﬁghting
upward against gravity, while during each descent he accelerated as
though falling down with gravity. On the Climber’s third attempt,
Helper and Hinderer events diverged. During Helper events, the
Helper entered the scene from the bottom of the hill and bumped
the Climber up from below twice, pushing him to the top of the
steep incline. The Climber then bounced up and down for several
seconds (as thoughhappy tohave achievedhis goal) and theHelper
moved back down the hill and offstage. During Hinderer events,
theHinderer entered the scene from the top of the hill and bumped
the Climber down from above twice, forcing him to the bottom
of the steep incline. The Climber then rolled end-over-end to
the very bottom of the hill and the Hinderer moved back up the
hill and offstage. Infants viewed alternating Helper and Hinderer
events until a pre-set habituation criterion was reached. Following
habituation, infants were presented with the Helper and Hinderer
so that they might choose between them. Both 6- and 10-month-
olds selectively reached for the Helper, suggesting they had either
positively evaluated the Helper, negatively evaluated the Hinderer,
or both.
Subsequently, Hamlin et al. (2007) explored the possibility
that infants’ preference for Helpers reﬂected only a perceptually
based preference for upward over downward movement, rather
than a socially based preference for those who help third par-
ties achieve their goals. New groups of 6- and 10-month-olds
viewed stimuli similar to the Helper/Hinderer condition, except
that an inanimate, circular red block with no eyes replaced the
formerly animate Climber. As self-propelled, non-inertial motion
reliably signals agency to infants in this age range (e.g., Premack,
1990; Leslie, 1994, 1995; Rakison and Poulin-Dubois, 2001;
Luo and Baillargeon, 2005), the inanimate circle never moved on
its own; instead, it was smoothly pushed up the hill by one char-
acter and smoothly pushed down the hill by the other. If infants
recognize that inanimate blocks cannot possess unfulﬁlled goals,
they should not view these scenes as instances of helping and
hindering and so should not prefer a“Pusher-Upper” to a“Pusher-
Downer.” Indeed, 6- and 10-month-olds chose Pusher-Uppers and
Pusher-Downers at equal rates, suggesting that preferences for
Helpers over Hinderers in the animate conditions reﬂected more
than a perceptually based preference for upward over downward
movement.
Scarf et al. (2012a) PERCEPTUAL CRITICISM OF THE HILL PARADIGM:
IT’S BOUNCING
However, as recently pointed out by Scarf et al. (2012b), upward
versus downward movement was not the only perceptual differ-
ence between helping and hindering events in Hamlin et al. (2007)
stimuli. Speciﬁcally, Scarf et al. (2012b) contend that infants
approached the Helper because it was associated with the Climber
bouncing at the top of the hill, and infants perceive bouncing as
a positive perceptual event. To test this hypothesis, Scarf et al.
(2012b) created their own stimuli and ran a series of studies
varying (1) whether the Climber bounced at the end of an event
or not, and (2) if there was bouncing, where and when it occurred
(at the top or the bottom of the hill, following the intervention
of the Helper or the Hinderer). Conﬁrming their hypothesis that
bouncing played a role in driving infants’ puppet choices, 10-
month-olds consistently reached for any character associated with
the Climber bouncing, whether it had previously helped or hin-
dered the Climber’s goal. Speciﬁcally, when the Climber bounced
at the top of the hill after being helped, infants preferred theHelper
(replicating Hamlin et al., 2007); but when the Climber bounced
at the bottom of the hill after being hindered, infants preferred
the Hinderer. When the Climber bounced both after being helped
and after being hindered, infants chose randomly between the
Helper and Hinderer, suggesting that being associated with the act
of bouncing is sufﬁcient to make Helpers and Hinderers equally
attractive. These results suggest that infants’preference forHelpers
in Hamlin et al.’s (2007) hill paradigm may have been due to low-
level perceptual aspects of the hill stimuli, rather than higher-level
capacities for social evaluation.
Hamlin et al.’s (2012) RESPONSE
Hamlin,Wynn, and Bloom were invited to respond to Scarf et al.’s
(2012b) perceptual criticism of their work (Hamlin et al., 2012).
In their response, Hamlin et al. (2012) noted that there are several
additional differences between the stimuli created by each group
besides bouncing, and that therefore the body of evidence pre-
sented to date is insufﬁcient to adjudicate between the social and
the perceptual accounts of infants’preferences in the hill paradigm.
First, unlike Hamlin et al.’s (2012) Climber whose gaze was ﬁxed
toward the topof the hill, Scarf et al.’s (2012b)Climber hadunﬁxed
pupils, which due to gravity and the slope of the hill meant the
Climber looked down the hill during much of the procedure.
Because gaze direction is a fundamental cue signaling the object of
one’s desire in both adults and infants (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Hood et al., 1998; Pelphrey et al., 2005), this may have prevented
infants from understanding that the Climber wished to reach the
top of the hill, or even implied he was oriented toward the bottom.
Second, while Hamlin et al.’s (2007) Climber varied his speed as
he ascended and descended the steep section of the hill, deceler-
ating when moving up and accelerating when moving down to
imply struggling and falling, Scarf et al.’s (2012b) Climber moved
up and down the hill at uniformly fast rates. This lack of speed
variation may have implied that each direction of the Climber’s
movement was equally intentional, once again obscuring his goal.
Finally, whereas at the end of his ﬁnal attempt Hamlin et al.’s
(2007) Climber moved upward only when pushed by the Helper
and downward only when pushed by the Hinderer, Scarf et al.’s
(2012b) Climber continued tomove upward between bumps from
the Helper (as though he were able to climb the steepest part of
the hill on his own) and startedmoving down the hill before being
bumped by the Hinderer (as though he decided to descend, per-
haps because he noted the Hinderer was coming down). Hamlin
et al. (2012) argued that these three issues might have prevented
infants from recognizing the Climber’s goal. If so, Scarf et al.’s
(2012b) infants might have chosen puppets based on bouncing
simply because they had no reason to interpret the Helper’s and
Hinderer’s actions as socially positive or negative.
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THE CURRENT STUDIES
Based on the evidence provided to date, infants’ preference for
Helpers in the hill paradigm may reﬂect considerations of goals,
of failed attempts to satisfy those goals, and of actions that facil-
itate and block such attempts; that is, infants’ choices may reﬂect
social evaluation. On the other hand, infants’ choices may reﬂect
brute perceptual preferences that lead infants to approach anyone
associatedwith an enjoyable physical act such as bouncing. Impor-
tantly, stimuli utilized in subsequent studies has not contained
such perceptual confounds and infants nevertheless appeared to
engage in social evaluation (Hamlin andWynn, 2011); however, it
remains a possibility that infants observing the hill scenario sub-
sequently choose puppets based on low-level perceptual variables
rather than higher-level social ones. If infants in the hill scenario
do in fact choose puppets based on low-level perceptual variables,
it would be important to reconsider the case for social evaluation
in infancy.
The current two experiments were created to distinguish
between the social and perceptual accounts of infants’ Helper
preferences in the hill paradigm. Experiment 1 attempted to repli-
cate both Hamlin et al.’s (2007) and Scarf et al.’s (2012a) ﬁndings
that infants prefer Helpers over Hinderers, by habituating infants
to stimuli videos created by each group (hereafter the Hamlin
condition and the Scarf condition). In Experiment 2, new stimuli
were created to directly examine the role of a candidate social cue,
whether the Climber gazed uphill, versus a candidate perceptual
cue, bouncing, in driving infants’ preference for Helpers. Specif-
ically, in the No Bounce condition the Climber’s gaze was ﬁxed
uphill, but he did not bounce at the top of the hill after being
helped. In contrast, in the Undirected Gaze condition the Climber
did bounce at the top of the hill after being helped, but his gaze
were not ﬁxed uphill.
Because previous research using the hill paradigm has
demonstrated the same effect sizes of preference for Helpers
over Hinderers throughout the ﬁrst year (Hamlin et al., 2007,
2010), and to speed data collection, infants between 6-
and 11 months of age were tested in all conditions. Anal-
yses of age are reported below; no signiﬁcant age effects
emerged. Verbal and written consent was obtained from infants’
guardians prior to participation. All informed consent and
data collection procedures were approved by the University
of British Columbia’s behavioral research ethics board (H10-
01808) and informed consent was given by the caregivers of all
participants.
EXPERIMENT 1: HAMLIN AND SCARF CONDITIONS
Methods
Participants. Forty-eight full-term and typically developing
infants between 6- and 11 months of age participated. Twenty-
four infants were randomly assigned to the Hamlin condition (12
females; average age = 9 months, 8 days; range = 6;12–11;8), and
24 to the Scarf condition (12 females; average age = 9 months,
1 day; range = 6;16–11;15). An additional 30 infants (11 in
Hamlin/19 in Scarf) began or completed the procedure but were
not included in the ﬁnal sample due to fussiness (5/10 infants),
procedural error (2/1), technical failure (0/2), failure to choose
either puppet (1/4), and parental interference (3/2).
Procedures. Stimuli utilized in the current studies are available
at http://cic.psych.ubc.ca/Example_Stimuli.html and are depicted
in Figure 1. Infants in the Hamlin condition were habituated to
the helping and hindering videos that Hamlin et al. (2007) pro-
vided as supplementary materials for their 2007 publication2, as
well as a set of videos in which the color/shape of the Helper and
Hinderer were switched (recorded at the same time as the supple-
mentary videos). Thus, in the Hamlin condition the Helper and
Hinderer were (counterbalanced across infants) a blue square and
a yellow triangle. Infants in the Scarf condition were habituated
to the videos that Scarf et al. (2012b) provided as supplementary
materials3. As only one set of Scarf stimulus videos was available
for download, the Helper was always a red triangle and the Hin-
derer was always a yellow square (experimenters presenting infants
with the choice between the Helper and Hinderer were blind to
experiment, condition, and puppet identity4). Consistent with
the differences between the Hamlin et al. (2007) and Scarf et al.
(2012a) stimuli detailed above, in both the Hamlin and the Scarf
conditions the Climber bounced at the top of the hill after helping,
and rolled end-over-end to the bottom of the hill after hinder-
ing. In the Hamlin condition the Climber’s gaze was ﬁxed uphill;
whereas in the Scarf condition the Climber’s gaze was unﬁxed. The
order of helping and hindering events was counterbalanced across
participants in each condition.
Video recordings of hill events were displayed on a large LCD
television screen (127 cm diagonal). Infants viewed the videos
from their parents’ laps, who were seated in a chair approximately
2m from the screen. Helper andHinderer events were presented in
alternation until an infant-controlled pre-set habituation criterion
was reached, to a maximum of 14 events5. A coder viewed infants’
faces on a computer monitor in a room down the hall from the
testing room, and recorded infants’ attention toward and away
from the display following each event using the program jHab
(Casstevens, 2007). Coding began from the point the Helper or
Hinderer left the stage and the Climber was motionless at the top
or bottomof the hill, and continueduntil infants looked away from
the display for two consecutive seconds or until 30 s elapsed. The
habituation criterion was met when infants’ summed attention to
any three consecutive events starting with the fourth event was
less than half their summed attention to the ﬁrst three events.
In subsequent ofﬂine attentional coding, attention toward and
2http://www.yale.edu/infantlab/socialevaluation
3http://www.youtube.com/user/DamianScarfPhD/videos
4Because the Helper/Hinderer were of an atypical color/shape combination in the
Scarf condition, some more observant research assistants may have inferred that
an infant was in the Scarf condition when they presented the choice. It is unlikely,
however, that this could have lead to any systematic biases in the pattern of results.
First, experimenters were unaware that identity was not counterbalanced in the
Scarf condition, and since identity is counterbalanced in every single other study in
the laboratory, it seems unlikely anyone would infer that it was not in this condition
alone. Second, research assistants are frequently reminded of the importance of
experimenter blinding, and know that they must quickly identify any situation in
which they become un-blinded to which puppet is which during a study so that
a new experimenter can be switched in; no experimenters reported detecting the
lack of identity counterbalancing in the Scarf condition. Finally, multiple different
experimenters (10 ormore per condition) presented choice for these studies,making
it unlikely that any one individual could have come to this knowledge via performing
several choices in the Scarf condition.
5Note: Scarf et al. (2012b) used 10 total events, and Hamlin et al. (2007) used 14.
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FIGURE 1 | Screen shots taken from video stimuli presented to infants in Experiment 1’s Hamlin condition (lineA depicts Helper events, line B depicts
Hinderer events) and Scarf condition (line C depicts Helper events, line D depicts Hinderer events).
away from the display during the helping and hindering acts was
coded from video recordings acquired during each testing session
using Observer (Noldus Information Technologies; 3 of 24 videos
were unavailable for ofﬂine coding in the Scarf condition due to
equipment failure).
After habituation, parents were asked to turn their chairs 90◦
to the left and to situate their infants at the front edge of their
laps while grasping them ﬁrmly around the lower abdomen, as
abdominal support best facilitates reaching behaviors in infancy
(e.g., Bertenthal and Von Hofsten, 1998). Parents were instructed
to close their eyes, and the experimenter who had coded infants’
attention during habituation (who remained blind to condi-
tion/puppet’s identity) entered the testing room and presented
infants with a white board on which foam versions of the Helper
and Hinderer had been afﬁxed approximately 30 cm apart (side
counterbalanced). To present the choice, the experimenter ﬁrst
held the board above the infant’s line of sight and greeted the
infant by saying “Hi [baby’s name]!,” ensuring the infant made
eye contact. The experimenter then lowered the board down
into the infant’s lap so that the characters were in reach, say-
ing “Who do you like?” The infant’s choice was coded online by
this experimenter as the ﬁrst puppet contacted with a visually
guided reach (i.e., looking must immediately precede touching).
Subsequent reliability coders re-coded 25% of infants’ choices in
each Condition from video; there was 100% agreement on puppet
choice.
Infants’ choices were compared using non-parametric bino-
mial tests (for within-condition analyses) and Pearson’s chi-square
tests (for across-condition analyses). Attention variables, such as
rate of habituation and looking time both during and follow-
ing Helper and Hinderer events in habituation were compared
using independent samples t-tests and univariate and repeated-
measures ANOVAs. Finally, the inﬂuence of age and various
attention measures on choice were tested using binary linear
regressions.
Results
Attention to puppet events. Means and standard errors are
detailed in Table 1. One infant in the Hamlin condition and zero
infants in the Scarf condition failed to reach the habituation crite-
rion within 14 events. Infants who did reach habituation in each
condition habituated at equal rates [meanHamlin (SEM) = 8.78
(0.66), meanScarf (SEM) = 8.75 (0.51); t45 = 0.04, p = 0.97;
η2 = 0.00]. Attention to Helper versus Hinderer events during
habituation was calculated in two different ways, based on the fact
that all infants viewed at least three Helper and three Hinderer
events. First, a comparison was made between how long infants
attended after the ﬁrst three Helper versus ﬁrst three Hinderer
events, as measured online during the procedure itself. Consis-
tent with our past reports, infants attended equally following
Helper and Hinderer events, both within and across each condi-
tion (repeated-measures ANOVAs, F’s< 1, p’s> 0.69), suggesting
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Table 1 | Average attention during and after the first three Helper and Hinderer events in each condition in Experiment 1.








Hamlin Condition 8.78 (0.66) 10.83 (0.48) 10.70 (0.44) 6.79 (0.86) 6.50 (0.80)
Scarf Condition 8.75 (0.51) 10.39 (0.54) 10.67 (0.75) 6.77 (0.85) 6.87 (1.01)
Numbers in parentheses are SEs.
that 6–11-month-olds have no baseline assumptions about indi-
viduals’ relative likelihood to help and to hinder third parties
(but see Geraci and Surian, 2011; Schmidt and Sommerville,
2011; Sloane et al., 2012, for evidence with toddlers’ expecta-
tions of fair/unfair distributions). Second, a comparisonwasmade
between how long infants attended during the ﬁrst three Helper
versus the ﬁrst three Hinderer events, as measured ofﬂine from
video. Infants attended equally duringHelper andHinderer events,
both within and across condition (repeated-measures ANOVAs,
F’s< 1, p’s> 0.48).
Choice. Choices are depicted in Figure 2. Non-parametric anal-
yses of infants’ preference for Helpers versus Hinderers revealed
that infants in the Hamlin and Scarf conditions preferred Helpers
at signiﬁcantly different rates (Pearson’s χ2 (df = 1) = 10.54,
p = 0.001). Speciﬁcally, infants in the Hamlin condition signif-
icantly preferred the Helper to the Hinderer (20 of 24, bino-
mial p = 0.002), whereas infants in the Scarf condition were
equally likely to prefer Helpers and Hinderers (9 of 24 chose
the Helper; binomial p = 0.31). Subsequent chi-square tests
revealed no effects of infant gender, order of Helper/Hinderer
events during habituation, shape/color of Helper puppet, or side
of Helper puppet during choice on infants’choiceswithin or across
conditions.
To examine whether attention during or after Helper and Hin-
derer events in habituation inﬂuenced an infant’s tendency to
choose the Helper during choice, binary logistic regressions on
FIGURE 2 | Results, Experiment 1. Infants’ choices of the Helper versus
the Hinderer in the Hamlin and Scarf conditions of Experiment 1.
**p < 0.005.
choice were performed within each condition attention during
and after the ﬁrst three Helper and Hinderer events as covari-
ates. No signiﬁcant effects emerged (binary logistic regression,
−0.55 < coefﬁcients < 0.33, p’s > 0.24). To examine whether
infants’ age affected their tendency to choose the Helper in either
condition, a binary logistic regression on choice was conducted
within each condition with age as a covariate; there was no effect
of age in the Hamlin condition (binary logistic regression, coefﬁ-
cient= −0.71, p = 0.18) and no effect of age in the Scarf condition
(coefﬁcient = 0.062, p = 0.84).
Summary and Discussion
Infants in Experiment 1 were habituated to videos downloaded
from the supplementary materials accompanying Hamlin et al.
(2007) and Scarf et al. (2012b). Choice results in the Ham-
lin condition replicated the results of Hamlin et al. (2007), but
choices in the Scarf condition failed to replicate the results
of Scarf et al. (2012b). Speciﬁcally, infants were signiﬁcantly
more likely to reach for the Helper versus the Hinderer in the
Hamlin condition, when the Climber’s eyes pointed up the
hill toward his goal, but were no more likely to reach for the
Helper versus the Hinderer in the Scarf condition, when the
Climber’s eyes were unﬁxed. Because the Climber bounced at
the top of the hill following helping acts in both the Ham-
lin and Scarf conditions, these results call into question Scarf
et al.’s (2012b) suggestion that bouncing alone is sufﬁcient to
drive infants’ preferences for Helpers over Hinderers in the hill
paradigm.
However, as outlined in section 1.3 of the introduction, the
original stimuli from Hamlin et al. (2007) and Scarf et al. (2012b)
contain several differences in addition to ﬁxed versus unﬁxed gaze,
including variations in the Climber’s speed upon ascending and
descending the hill and whether or not the Helper and Hinderer
are uniquely responsible for pushing the Climber to the top and
bottom. These differences make it difﬁcult to determine exactly
why infants preferred Helpers to Hinderers in the Hamlin but
not in the Scarf conditions: between-condition differences may
have been due to ﬁxed versus unﬁxed eye gaze, or they may
have stemmed from other uncontrolled aspects of the displays.
These differences, as well as the difference in Helper and Hinderer
shape/color between the Hamlin and Scarf conditions and the
inability to counterbalance Helper identity in the Scarf condition,
make Experiment 1 an imperfect test of the social versus percep-
tual accounts of infants’ Helper preferences. Furthermore, results
from Experiment 1 do not effectively clarify the role of bouncing
in infants’ positive evaluations of Helpers in the hill paradigm:
although results suggest that a bouncing event is not sufﬁcient to
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inspire positive evaluation of Helpers (as there was bouncing in
the Scarf condition but infants showed no systematic preferences),
it may nevertheless be necessary for them. For instance, infants in
the Hamlin condition may have viewed bouncing as the Climber’s
positive reaction upon achieving his goal, further reinforcing that
he had intended to climb the hill, and highlighting the Helper’s
role in facilitating that intention. Experiment 2 was designed to
distinguish between these possibilities.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was run concurrently with Experiment 1, and was
designed to provide amore stringent test of the role of both bounc-
ing and uphill gaze in driving infants’ preference for Helpers in the
hill paradigm. New stimuli were created by ﬁlming puppet shows
performed on a wooden hill apparatus identical to the foam core
apparatus utilized by Hamlin et al. (2007) and Scarf et al. (2012b)
(but note that the hill itself was somewhat lighter in color). In the
No Bounce condition, the Climber’s gaze was ﬁxed uphill, but he
did not bounce upon reaching the top of the hill during Helper
events, nor did he roll end-over-end to the bottom of the hill
during Hinderer events. In the Undirected Gaze condition, the
Climber’s gaze was not ﬁxed upward, but he did bounce upon
reaching the top of the hill during Helper events and did roll
end-over-end to the bottom of the hill during Hinderer events.
All other aspects of the stimuli were identical across conditions:
the Climber decelerated upon ascending the hill and accelerated
upon descending, and during his ﬁnal attempt moved to the top
and bottom of the hill solely through bumps from the Helper
and Hinderer. If the social evaluation account of infants’ Helper
preferences is correct, in Experiment 2 infants in the No Bounce
condition should prefer the Helper but infants in the Undirected
Gaze condition should not. On the other hand, if the percep-
tual evaluation account is correct, infants in the Undirected Gaze
condition should prefer the Helper but infants in the No Bounce
condition should not.
Methods
Participants. Fifty full-term and typically developing infants
between 6- and 11months of age participated. Twenty-ﬁve infants
were randomly assigned to the No Bounce condition (12 females;
average age= 9months, 4 days; range= 6;17–11;13), and 25 to the
Undirected Gaze condition (13 females; average age = 9 months,
10 days; range = 6;15–11;10). An additional 23 infants (8 in No
Bounce/15 in Undirected Gaze) began or completed the proce-
dure but were not included in the ﬁnal sample due to fussiness
(4/7 infants), procedural error (2/4), technical failure (1/1), fail-
ure to choose either puppet (1/2), and parental interference (0/1).
Conditions in Experiment 2 contained one more baby per condi-
tion than conditions in Experiment 1 because more babies were
scheduled than were needed; removing the last baby from each
condition in Experiment 2 reveals the exact samepattern of results.
Due to a period of lab construction, one infant in the Undirected
Gaze condition was tested in an alternative space with a smaller
screen (81 cm diagonal). This participant was seated closer to
the screen (∼1.2 m away). This infant chose the Helper puppet;
removing this participant from the sample does not inﬂuence the
results.
Procedures. Stimuli are available at http://cic.psych.ubc.ca/Exam
ple_Stimuli.html and are depicted in Figure 3. In both the No
Bounce and Undirected Gaze conditions the Helper and Hinderer
puppets were a yellow triangle and a blue square; Helper iden-
tity was counterbalanced across infants within each condition. All
attentional coding, choice, and data analysis procedures are iden-
tical to those of Experiment 1. Reliability coders re-coded 25% of
infants’ choices in each condition; there was 100% agreement on
puppet choice.
Results
Attention to puppet events. Means and SE are detailed in Table 2.
One infant in the No Bounce condition and two in the Undi-
rected Gaze condition failed to reach the habituation criterion
within 14 events. Infants who did reach habituation habituated at
equal rates [meanNoBounce (SEM)= 8.58 (0.52),meanUndirectedGaze
(SEM) = 8.09 (0.39); t45 = 0.76, p = 0.45; η2 = 0.01]. As in
Experiment 1, a repeated-measures ANOVA on infants’ atten-
tion following Helper and Hinderer events with condition as a
between-subjects factor revealed no signiﬁcant effects or interac-
tions (repeated-measures ANOVAs, F’s < 1, p’s > 0.55). Unlike
in Experiment 1, however, there was a signiﬁcant main effect
of condition on infants’ attention during Helper and Hinderer
events (F1,44 = 11.13; p = 0.002, η2p = 0.20), reﬂecting that infants
attended signiﬁcantly longer during Helper events and marginally
longer during Hinderer events in the No Bounce condition than
in the Undirected Gaze condition [meanHelperNB (SEM) = 12.06
(0.25), meanHelperUG (SEM) = 10.49 (0.31), F1,44 = 15.78,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.26; meanHindererNB (SEM) = 11.60 (0.12),
meanHindererUG (SEM) = 10.51 (0.56); F1,44 = 3.56, p = 0.07,
η2p = 0.08]. In addition, within the No Bounce condition specif-
ically infants attended marginally longer during Helper events
than during Hinderer events (F1,22 = 3.50, p = 0.08, η2p = 0.14;
note that the average difference is less than half of a second);
whereas infants in theUndirectedGaze condition attended equally
during Helper and Hinderer events (F1,22 = 0.002, p = 0.97,
η2p = 0.00). These attentional differences will be returned to
below.
Choice. Choices are depicted in Figure 4. Non-parametric anal-
yses of infants’ preference for Helpers versus Hinderers revealed
that infants in the No Bounce and Undirected Gaze conditions
preferred Helpers at signiﬁcantly different rates [Pearson’s χ2
(df = 1) = 4.16, p = 0.04]. Speciﬁcally, infants in the No Bounce
condition signiﬁcantly preferred the Helper to the Hinderer (19
of 25, binomial p = 0.01), whereas infants in the Undirected Gaze
condition were equally likely to prefer Helpers and Hinderers (12
of 25 chose the Helper; binomial p = 1). As in Experiment 1, addi-
tional chi-square tests revealed no effects of infant gender, order of
Helper/Hinderer events during habituation, shape/color of Helper
puppet, or side of Helper puppet during choice on infants’ choices
within or across conditions.
As in the Hamlin and Scarf conditions of Experiment 1, there
was no effect of age on infants’ tendency to choose the Helper
in the No Bounce condition (binary logistic regression, coefﬁ-
cient = 0.14, p = 0.63) nor in the Undirected Gaze condition
(coefﬁcient = 0.22, p = 0.48). Although attentional differences
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FIGURE 3 | Screen shots taken from video stimuli presented to infants in Experiment 2’s No Bounce condition (line A depicts Helper events, line B
depicts Hinderer events) and Undirected Gaze condition (line C depicts Helper events, line D depicts Hinderer events).
Table 2 | Average attention during and after the first three Helper and Hinderer events in each condition in Experiment 2.








No Bouncecondition 8.58 (0.52) 12.06 (0.25)1,a 11.60 (0.12)1,2 7.38 (0.90) 7.12 (1.05)
Undirected Gaze condition 8.09 (0.39) 10.49 (0.31)a 10.51 (0.56)2 7.66 (0.77) 7.22 (1.15)
Numbers in parentheses are SEs. Boxes containing the same letters are signiﬁcantly different from each other (p < 0.001); boxes containing the name numbers are
marginally different from each other (p < 0.08).
during (but not after) Helper and Hinderer events emerged both
across and within conditions in Experiment 2, it is unlikely that
these differences are responsible for between-condition differences
in infants’ tendency to prefer Helpers to Hinderers. First, as in
Experiment 1, binary logistic regressions on choice with attention
both during and after Helper events and during and after Hinderer
events as covariates revealed no effects of any covariate in either
condition (−0.27< coefﬁcient< 0.63, p’s> 0.13), suggesting that
attending more during particular events during habituation did
not inﬂuence individual infants’ tendency to choose the Helper
rather than the Hinderer. Furthermore, infants in the Hamlin
and Scarf conditions of Experiment 1 and infants in the Undi-
rected Gaze condition of Experiment 2 attended equally during
all events, but showed a signiﬁcant preference for Helpers over
Hinderers only in the Hamlin condition. Together, these results
suggest that it was whether or not the Climber demonstrated a
clear unfulﬁlled goal, and not differences in attention to particular
events or conditions, that drove infants’ patterns of choice across
conditions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across Experiments 1 and 2, 6–11-month-olds’ pattern of pref-
erence for Helpers over Hinderers suggests that they evaluate
characters based on their relative social value, rather than on
whether they happen to be associated with bouncing. Speciﬁcally,
when the Climber’s gaze was consistent with the goal of reaching
the top of the hill (in the Hamlin condition in Experiment 1 and
in the No Bounce condition in Experiment 2) infants selectively
reached for theHelper who pushed theClimber up the hill over the
Hinderer who pushed him down. In contrast, when the Climber’s
gaze was inconsistent with the goal of reaching the top of the hill
(in the Scarf condition in Experiment 1 and in the Undirected
Gaze condition in Experiment 2) infants chose randomly between
the characters. Critically, the Climber bouncing upon reaching
the top of the hill was neither necessary, nor sufﬁcient, for infants
to engage in social evaluation: 19 of 25 infants (76%) preferred
the Helper in the No Bounce condition in which no bouncing
occurred, but only 21 of 49 (43%) preferred the Helper in the
Scarf and Undirected Gaze conditions, though bouncing occurred
www.frontiersin.org January 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1563 | 7
Hamlin The case for social evaluation in preverbal infants
FIGURE 4 | Results, Experiment 2. Infants’ choices of the Helper versus
the Hinderer in the No Bounce and Undirected Gaze conditions of
Experiment 2. *p < 0.05.
in both. It was also not the case that bouncing somehow prevented
infants from engaging in social evaluation by distracting them
from their preference for the Helper: 20 of 24 (83%) infants in the
Hamlin condition in which the Climber gazed uphill preferred the
Helper, even though the Climber bounced upon reaching the top.
Together, this pattern of results contradicts Scarf et al.’s (2012b)
lower-level perceptual account of infants’ choices and supports
Hamlin et al.’s (2007) higher-level social account: infants’ choices
appear sensitive to the basic notion that an action is only helpful
or unhelpful to the extent that it facilitates or blocks someone’s
goal. These results are consistent with a growing body of work
suggesting that infants’ evaluations are selective to the actions of
social agents toward social agents, ﬂexible based on the context in
which helpful and unhelpful actions occur, and focused speciﬁ-
cally on helpers’ and hinderers’ mental states (see Hamlin, 2013a
for review).
The critical nature of gaze in the current studies is con-
sistent with a large literature highlighting the role of gaze in
understanding others’ goals, both in typically developing and
autistic individuals (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al.,
1995; Hood et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 1998; Pelphrey et al.,
2005). Although various movement cues (for example, speed
acceleration/deceleration) may also have clouded infants’ under-
standing of the Climber’s goals in the Scarf condition, the current
studies were speciﬁcally designed to address Scarf et al.’s (2012b)
contention that infants’ preference for Helpers is solely due to
bouncing as well as to highlight the role of uphill gaze. Because
isolatingwhethermovement cues play a unique role in infants’goal
perception was outside the scope of this work, the Climber moved
as thoughhe intended to climb the hill in both conditions inExper-
iment 2. That infants did not prefer the Helper in the Undirected
Gaze condition despite the presence of goal-directed movements
suggests that gaze directionmight be a relatively stronger indicator
of another’s goal than are their movements. If so, future stud-
ies might examine the role of goal-directed movement in infants’
social evaluations by utilizing characters whose movements do or
do not appear directed toward the goal of reaching the top of the
hill, but who have no eyes at all (see, e.g., Kuhlmeier et al., 2003;
Wagner and Carey, 2005; see also Heider and Simmel, 1944).
Beyond distinguishing between the social and perceptual
accounts of infants’ puppet choices in the hill paradigm speciﬁ-
cally, there are signiﬁcant theoretical reasons to continue to explore
these issues. In particular, Hamlin et al. (2007) raise the possi-
bility that “the capacity to evaluate individuals on the basis of
their social interactions is universal and unlearned” (Hamlin et al.,
2007; quoted in Scarf et al., 2012b). This is a theoretical claim
that, if true, would call for a partial revision of some of our most
basic assumptions about theway complex social capacities develop
(e.g., Carpendale and Lewis, 2006). Therefore, it is no wonder that
developmental researchers like Scarf et al. (2012b) have beenmoti-
vated to examine the accuracy of data purporting to demonstrate
high-level capacities in pre-verbal infants, andwish to“speakmore
generally to the issue of rich interpretations of infant behavior.”
Indeed, there is a long debate between developmental scientists
about how best to interpret necessarily simple infant responses
such as looking time or preference behaviors. Whereas some are
willing to attribute rich cognitive bases to such behaviors as long as
there are control conditions to rule out some of themore plausible
low-level interpretations, others criticize all rich interpretations on
the grounds that lower-level explanations are always possible and
always preferable (for examples fromboth sides see Premack, 1990;
Leslie, 1994; Spelke, 1994, 1998; Haith, 1998; Aslin, 2000; Bogartz
et al., 2000; Cohen and Marks, 2002; Wynn, 2002; Kagan, 2008;
Ruffman et al., 2012; Scarf et al., 2012a,b; Margolis and Laurence,
2013). That said, whatever the current evidence for and against
either theoretical stance, to the extent that such debate promotes
rigorous empirical efforts to distinguish between alternatives it can
only beneﬁt the ﬁeld as a whole.
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